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NOTES
Insurance Coverage for Pollution Liability in the United States
and the United Kingdom: Covering Troubled Waters*
"Contrariwise," continued Tweedledee, "if it was so, it might be;
and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic" 1
Despite the "common roots of their political and legal systems,"2
American and British policies with respect to environmental control di-
verge in a number of important aspects. The American environmental
regulation system has been characterized as "the most rigid and rule-
oriented to be found in any industrial society," and the British, "the most
flexible and informal."' With respect to the control of toxic substances
in both industrialized nations, the American adversarial approach creats
intense conflict between industry and government, whereas British indus-
try enjoys a more cooperative relationship with regulatory officials.4 The
American system of pollution control has been criticized as ineffective
because its strict regulatory scheme causes enforcement difficulties,'
* The author wishes to thank Professor Wilbur C. Leatherberry, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, for his thoughtful guidance and encouragement.
I L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 52 (1946). A subsequent passage, "When I
use a word, "Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it meansjust what I choose it to mean -
neither more nor less," id. at 94 (emphasis in original)., was used as the basis for comparing judicial
interpretation of insurance policy pollution exclusion clauses to "Alice In Wonderland" logic in
Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. LJ. 1237 (1986).
Carroll's parody, in this earlier passage, of the inflectional forms of the verb "to be" is particu-
larly germane to an inquiry into the possible meanings of "occurrence," a subject which has also
produced an onslaught of pollution liability insurance coverage disputes.
2 D. VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GREAT
BRrrAIN AND THE UNrED STATES 21 (1986).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Acton, Understanding Superfund: 4 Progress Report, 1989 INST. FOR CIV. JUST. vii.
[Superfund's] liability-based approach... provides potentially conflicting incentives
and inefficiencies. For example, both the EPA and private parties proceed in an atmos-
phere in which they are legal adversaries; at the same time, they are encouraged to cooper-
ate to identify suitable remedies... Because the EPA needs evidence strong enough to
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whereas the British system may be perceived as somewhat lax because of
the intimate role of business in environmental policy making.6 Britain's
localized style of pollution control is also in tension with European Eco-
nomic Community ("EEC") environmental policies, enumerated as
broad "directives," 7 which are more closely modelled after U.S. environ-
mental policies.
Insurance coverage for environmental liability is increasingly at is-
sue in U.S. law, raising questions as to the insurability of environmental
perils' (which tend to be "low-probability, high consequence") 9 and the
propriety of using the insurance market as a mechanism for achieving
socially acceptable levels of environmental risk.10 If Great Britain con-
tinues to develop environmental policies like those in America, similar
issues are likely to arise on the other side of the Atlantic as well.
As Judge Learned Hand wrote, the relationship between Great Brit-
ain and the United States shares a central common ground:
There is a spiritual cousinage between us that will not down; and
though, like other cousins, we shall continue to differ, and our differ-
ences will appear the more exasperating just on that account, still there
is always hope, and always the chance, that in the end we shall both
recognize the bond.., that rests upon common moral fealties ......
support liability claims in court, its site investigations are elaborate and expensive. And
Superfund's provisions for unlimited liability may discourage some polluters from
cooperating.
Id.
6 D. VOGEL, supra note 2, at 172-76.
Compared to that of other political constituencies, most notably that of environmentalists,
the political position of [British] business is clearly a privileged one: it is closely consulted
before pollution controls are both made and enforced... While business does not always
win, its views are always given careful consideration by government officials ....
In America, on the other hand, while business certainly does not lack opportunities to
influence environmental policy, its participation is neither assumed nor assured: it must be
constantly asserted.
Id. at 172.
7 Macrory, British Environmental Law: Major Strands and Characteristics, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L.
287, 299 (1989); Haigh, Impact of the EEC Environmental Programme: The British Example, 4
CONN. J. INT'L L. 453, 461 (1989).
"The British will now have to get accustomed to living with unenforceable guiding principles."
Id.
s M. KATZMAN, CHEMICAL CATASTROPHES: REGULATING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
THROUGH POLLUTION LIABILITY INSURANCE ix (1985).
9 Id. at 1.
10 Id. at ix.
II Burger, The Anglo-American Exchange: Our Spiritual Cousinage, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv.
633 (1986) (quoting L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 290 (3d ed. 1960)).
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INTRODUCTION TO POLLUTION REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Americans are increasingly aware of the problems associated with
hazardous wastes since the emergence in the 1970s of such hazardous
waste disasters as Love Canal, New York, Times Beach, Missouri,
Stringfellow, California, and Woburn, Massachusetts,12 and public con-
cern is continually bringing environmental issues to the forefront of fed-
eral, state and local policy decisions. Indeed, it is difficult to look about
the room in any contemporary setting without encountering an item
which involved industrial waste at some stage of its production. Poten-
tially hazardous waste sites in the United States have been discovered at
an alarming rate.13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
figures for 1986 indicated that more than 25,000 potentially hazardous
waste sites had been identified,14 and current estimates exceed 30,000
sites. 15
Existing environmental laws in the late 1970s, primarily the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") 6 , the Clean Water
Act ("CWA")1 7 and the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"), 18 proved
ineffective at dealing with the problem of often long-abandoned hazard-
ous waste sites.19 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
12 Love Canal, a neighborhood of Niagara Falls, New York rose to national attention in Au-
gust 1978 when New York State officials recommended the evacuation of pregnant women and
children because of contamination from a dump site beneath the neighborhood containing approxi-
mately 21,800 tons of toxic waste. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1988, at B1, col. 2. See also Askey v.
Occidental Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1984).
At Times Beach, Missouri, thousands of gallons of dioxin were disposed of by being spread
upon the town's dirt roads in the early 1970s. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceu-
tical & Chem. Co., 811 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd in part, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988).
At the Stringfellow, California, site over 34 millon gallons of hazardous wastes, which had been
dumped into "acid pits" over a sixteen year period ending in 1972, created serious groundwater
contamination. See United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1157
(1986).
At Woburn, Massachusetts the community suffered from well-water contamination in the 1970s
resulting from the improper disposal upon the ground of hazardous materials including trichloroeth-
ylene ("TCE") at a former leather tannery. See Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219
(D. Mass. 1986).
13 As of March, 1988, contaminated sites were being discovered in the United States almost
daily. Crisham & Davis, CGL Coverage For Hazardous Substances Clean-Up, 30 FOR THE DEFENSE
21 (Mar. 1988).
14 Finegan, Double Billing, INc., Mar. 1988, at 50, 52.
15 By the end of 1988, approximately 30,000 sites had been investigated, and almost 1,200 sites
placed on the EPA's National Priorities List. Acton, supra note 5, at 25-26.
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1988).
17 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1987).
18 Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-10(1988).
19 S. CooKE, LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILrTy, AND Lm-
GATION § 12.02[3], at 12-16 (1989).
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Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 20 or
"Superfund" as it is commonly known, to deal with the failure of pre-
CERCLA federal laws to establish liability for cleanups, as well as varia-
tion in state laws as to the availability of damages and injunctive relief.21
"[T]he legislative history makes clear that Congress enacted CERCLA
mindful of two important considerations: the magnitude of the hazard-
ous waste problem in the United States, and the inadequacy of then ex-
isting environmental laws to remedy it."
22
Where previous environmental statutes such as RCRA, CWA and
SDWA had been enacted as prospective regulations affecting manufac-
turing guidelines and standards, CERCLA employed a unique approach,
imposing liability on a strict, joint-and-several, and retroactive basis.23
As amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 ("SARA"), 24 CERCLA holds polluters liable for both remedial
cleanup costs and injury-related damages resulting from past manufac-
turing, disposal and transportation activities which often occurred many
years prior to CERCLA's enactment in 1980.25
CERCLA took the point of view that the polluter should bear
primary responsibility for financing cleanups. As a matter of policy,
Congress could have decided that those who benefit from a reduced
risk to health or the environment should pay.
By and large, the health, environmental, and aesthetic conse-
quences of a hazardous waste facility are highly localized, as are the
beneficiaries of site remediation.
2 6
Cleanup costs for Superfund sites can easily exceed several million
dollars,27 and polluters (once they are identified as Potentially Responsi-
ble Parties ("PRPs") by the EPA or the state equivalent) are likely to
seek indemnification from their insurance carriers under comprehensive
general liability ("CGL") policies.2 s
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1980), reauthorized and amended in part by Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986),
codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West Supp. 1987).
21 S. COOKE, supra note 19, § 12.02[3], at 12-17.
22 Id.
23 Acton, supra note 5, at 6-7. See also, Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of
Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 942, 957 (1988).
24 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West Supp.
1987)).
25 See generally Acton, supra note 5, at 4-10.
26 Id at 9-10.
27 In 1986 the average cost of cleanup compliance, according to a study prepared for the Amer-
ican Insurance Association, was $9.2 million per Superfund site. Cheek, Site Owners or Liability
Insurers: Who Should Pay For Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste?, 8 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 75, 81
(1988). The same study estimated that, under the stricter cleanup standards mandated by the SARA
amendments to CERCLA in 1986, this figure might increase by a factor of 2.6 or more. Id. at 77.
28 See generally Cheek, supra note 27, at 75-76. See also Pendygraft, Plews, Clark & Wright,
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Pollution liability insurance coverage disputes have been increas-
ingly litigated since shortly after the enactment of CERCLA in 1980.
The trend shows no signs of abatement, especially because of the enor-
mous financial magnitude of most disputes. Applicable State law is
mercurial and, since federal courts apply state law under the Erie29 doc-
trine in choice of law and contract interpretation matters, the Supreme
Court has been especially reluctant to become embroiled in a
resolution.30
INTRODUCTION TO POLLUTION REGULATION IN GREAT BRITAIN
The United Kingdom, a densely populated nation since before medi-
eval times, has been developing laws which might be considered "envi-
ronmental" for many centuries. 3 ' The development of nuisance law
serves as an example. The United Kingdom was one of the first countries
to industrialize and urbanize, and the development of its environmental
laws was somewhat piecemeal, as needs and circumstances arose.32 This
developmental process has resulted in three main "strands" of environ-
mental law: countryside protection, pollution control and land-use plan-
ning.33 No national waste disposal regulations of consequence existed
until certain disposal incidents spurred hurried legislation in 1972, 3' but
a cohesive national pollution control policy, as exists in the United
States, has not yet been implemented.
British pollution control statutes tend to be prospective, as opposed
to retrospective, and they are enforced more administratively than judi-
cially. This difference, relative to the approach in the United States, may
lie in central differences in the judicial, legislative and administrative sys-
tems of government in both countries,35 as well as in differences between
each nation's individual environmental problems and priorities.36
Enforcement of British environmental statutes is often based upon
common law and tort principles of nuisance and negligence. Statutory
Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Developments in CERCLA Liability and Insurance
Coverage Litigation, 21 IND. L. REV. 117, 138-140 (1988) [hereinafter Pendygraft].
29 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30 Note, The Superfund Insurance Dilemma: Defining the Super Risks and Rights of Compre-
hensive General Liability Policies, 21 IND. L. REV. 735, 741-42 (1988). The Supreme Court has
declined opportunities to resolve similar insurance coverage issues pertaining to asbestos litigation in
the early 1980s. Cheek, supra note 27, at 91.
31 Macrory, supra note 7, at 287.
32 Id. at 289.
33 Id. at 289-90.
34 Macrory, The Control of Hazardous Wastes - Law Enforcement In Practice, 4 CoNN. J.
INT'L L. 333, 336 (1989) (The Legislation resulted in the Deposit of Poisonous Waste Act, 1972, ch.
21, replaced by Control of Pollution Act, 1974, ch. 40).
35 D. VOGEL, supra note 2, at 171.
36 Id. at 151-52.
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sanctions for pollution offenders exist, but they tend to be relatively mild
and are seldom imposed.37 Instead of a federally implemented enforce-
ment scheme, as exists under the EPA in the United States, British pollu-
tion regulations are generally enforced by local officials acting with broad
discretion to work informally with polluting offenders.3  Often the ad-
ministration of enforcement consists of simple conferences between ad-
ministrators and polluters on a case by case basis, balancing the degree of
health and environmental risk with peripheral factors such as economic
benefits of a particular industry "on site."39
Of course, not all differences between Great Britain's and the United
States' environmental outlooks are necessarily policy based:
Because Great Britain has a relatively large number of rapidly flowing
rivers, a proportionately long coastline, and relatively high and strong
winds, much of its environment is capable of absorbing relatively large
amounts of pollution without adverse affects [sic] on the environmental
quality experienced by its citizens. Certainly no British city has the
peculiar geographical and climatic disadvantages of Los Angeles.
40
However, Great Britain also is much smaller and has approximately ten
times the population density of the United States,41 factors which in-
crease the necessity of pollution regulation. Recent estimates conclude
that over ten thousand hectares42 in England and almost four thousand
hectares in Wales are contaminated, but there are no indications that
undiscovered toxic sites exist anywhere near the scale present in the
United States.43 "Perhaps because of this, no specialized legislation deals
with the problems of past sites and the resulting responsibilities for dam-
age or clean-ups."'  However, "[v]arious amendments and changes to
the details of the present [British] law currently are under consideration
",45
COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION
This note will compare "occurrence" based liability insurance cov-
erage in the United States and Great Britain, with particular emphasis
upon the meaning of the terms "sudden" and "accidental" as they apply
to the definition of "occurrence" and to the "sudden and accidental" ex-
37 Id. at 146.
38 aId
39 Macrory, supra note 34, at 333.
40 D. VOGEL, supra note 2, at 148.
41 Id.
42 A hectare equals 2.47 acres. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 724 (3d ed.
1975).
43 Macrory, supra note 34, at 339-40.
44 Id. at 340.
45 Ia at 334.
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ception to the pollution exclusion contained in the standard CGL insur-
ance policy." For the United States, the focus will be upon CGL
insurance coverage for CERCLA based delayed manifestation pollution
liability. For Great Britain, because of the relative lack of litigated pollu-
tion related indemnity claims, the focus will be upon general liability in-
surance. British underwriters also provide primary and excess CGL
coverage in the United States, and the possibility of each country's insur-
ance and environmental laws being imported by the other increases the
significance of a mutual understanding.
Polluter liability under CERCLA in the United States is strict, ren-
dering intent to pollute immaterial, but the interpretation of "accidental"
for insurance coverage purposes, in both the pollution exclusion excep-
tion and the definition of "ocLurrence," requires an assessment of pol-
luter intent. The appropriateness of insurance coverage for polluter
liability, as a matter of national policy in either Great Britain or the
United States, may be questionable. Neither the pollution regulatory
policies nor the insurance coverage laws of either country are free of dif-
ferences. For instance, federal pollution statutes and regulations in the
United States are strictly drafted, and liability is harshly imposed. Yet
U.S. courts, applying state law, have been inconsistent with respect to
insurance coverage for pollution-related liability. In Great Britain, pol-
lution laws tend to be legislated and enforced rather permissively, yet
insurance policy coverage tends to be more strictly based upon specific
policy provisions.
Pollution law and insurance law both serve compensation and deter-
rence functions.' At first blush, the notion of insurability for pollution
related liability seems at odds with CERCLA's Congressional mandate
that polluters bear the remedial expenses for past pollution in an effort to
internalize industry's otherwise external costs.47 The possibility of pol-
luters being able to avoid the consequences of CERCLA liability, via
general liability insurance coverage, brings into question CERCLA's
ability to deter future pollution activity. On the other hand, the purchase
of insurance coverage in the first place (on a prospective basis) represents
an internalization of at least some of the costs associated with the unex-
46 M. KATZMAN, supra note 8, at 3.
An efficient policy of deterrence minimizes the cost of accidents and accident prevention.
This efficiency goal has generally guided the application of tort law. As articulated by
Judge Learned Hand, proper care requires that the costs of reducing accidents be balanced
against the costs of accidents times the change in their probability of occurrence. Because
this principle ignores where the losses fall, it may conflict with the equity objective of just
compensation. A cost-minimizing policy may leave the victim bearing the losses, whereas
current environmental policy is based on the view that the polluter pays.
Id. (citations omitted).
47 See Abraham, supra note 23, at 956-60 (addressing the problems posed to the insurance
industry by retroactive and joint and several liability).
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pected and unintended consequences of the risks associated with "doing
business."
The extent to which insurance coverage for retroactive CERCLA
liability undermines the law's deterrence feature is questionable because
the insurance industry has already adapted its policy forms to specifically
exclude coverage for pollution related claims. Of course, insurance cov-
erage for intended harm is not available, as a matter of public policy. 4 8
But insurance coverage for intentional, calculated risk-taking is seldom
excluded in either the United States or Great Britain.
A comparison of coverage for pollution liability in Great Britain and
the United States necessarily involves a comparison of the bases for the
imposition of polluter liability. It also involves a comparison of the na-
ture of "accidental" occurrences of insurable events under both legal re-
gimes. The vast amount of litigation over such matters in the United
States indicates and contributes to what has been called an "insurance
crisis" for environmental liability coverage, a major part of the recent
tort liability insurance crisis.49 However, the existence of an insurance
crisis does not necessarily mean that the insurance industry is a com-
pletely inappropriate mechanism for dealing with the problems associ-
ated with environmental liability. The costs and effects of retroactively
imposing strict joint and several liability upon industry alone must also
be considered. 0
48 Insurance coverage for intentionally caused losses is consistently excluded, on the basis that
"insurance should only be employed to transfer risks associated with fortuitous occurrences," R.
KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 518 (Student ed. 1988) [hereinafter KEETON & WIDISS].
The notion of insurability for intentional wrongs or illegal acts is counter to public policy.
Wanton or reckless acts, however, although a basis for constructive intent for punitive damages
purposes, do not usually constitute a basis for the denial of liability insurance coverage for "acciden-
tal" losses. Id. at 524-25.
When an innocent individual is injured as a result of someone's wanton or reckless
action, there is considerable concern with assuring compensation for the individual who
sustains injuries.... On the other hand, there is also concern about allowing insureds to
shift the economic responsibility for the type of conduct that society would like to discour-
age and deter. Frequently, it is difficult to either discern or predict the appropriate accom-
modation between these goals or interests.
Id. at 525.
49 Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHio ST. L.J. 399, 404-05
(1987) (stating that, as measured by comparisons to the Consumer Price Index, Gross National
Product, and level of insurance company payouts and associated counsel fees, the magnitude of
recent tort liability costs has created havoc in the insurance industry's premium setting behavior).
so Although the author of the following passage was referring to a cost/benefit consideration
raised in a case dealing with the Clean Air Act, one must remain mindful of the benefits associated
with modem life:
We cannot entirely eliminate hazards created by people; rather, we must accept some risks
that are insignificant, uncertain, or impossible to control; we must accept others because
the costs of controlling them still further, even from an ethical point of view, are grossly
disproportionate to the additional safety we may gain. To close down an electric company
Vol. 23:109
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I. LIABILrrY FOR POLLUTION
A. United States Pollution Liability
CERCLA, enacted hurriedly in 1980 at the end of the 96th Con-
gress in a monumental effort to pass the legislation before the end of the
Carter administration, created a $1.6 billion fund for hazardous waste
cleanup. The Superfund was increased under SARA, in 1986, by another
$8.5 billion for the period 1986-1991,1 and imposes "broad-based liabil-
ity intended to cover any and all parties who at any time handled"52
hazardous waste.
CERCLA provides for causes of action on behalf of both the U.S.
EPA and individual states. Upon identification and investigation of a
hazardous waste site, and notification of PRPs, the government can pur-
sue a "response action" under CERCLA § 10411 (and then bring subse-
quent action to recover its costs to reimburse the Superfund under
CERCLA § 10711) in either of two ways: (i) via "removal" actions, i.e.,
temporary mitigating measures, or (ii) "remedial" actions, i.e., perma-
nent measures in response to an actual or threatened release of hazardous
material.5" The government can also elect to pursue injunctive "adminis-
trative enforcement," compelling a responsible party to perform the
clean-up responses itself, under CERCLA § 106.56 Although the EPA
has a series of legislatively mandated factors to consider in deciding upon
which of these alternative actions to initiate, the EPA has broad discre-
tion depending upon the specific circumstances involved."
B. British Pollution Liability
The primary method of disposal, accounting for approximately
if it is unable, in spite of making impressive efforts, to meet air quality standards... may be
a Pyrrhic victory for health and safety regulation, because people need electricity as well as
clean air to survive.
M. SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 198
(1988) (emphasis in original) (citing Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976)).
51 Acton, supra note 5, at vii.
52 Note, CERCLA Cleanup Costs Under Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies"
Property Damage or Economic Damage?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1988) (citing CERCLA
§ 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. 1988)).
Section 107(a)(l)-(4) defines potentially responsible parties, and imposes liability for:
A) government removal or remedial action costs, B) citizen response costs, C) damaging natural
resources and related assessment costs, and D) health assessment costs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)
(1988).
53 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
54 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
55 Note, CERCLA Cost Recovery Suitsv A Suit Against an Insured For Damages Under a Com-
prehensive General Liability Policy, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 829, 836 (1988).
56 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988).
57 Note, supra note 55, at 837-39.
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ninety-five percent of the United Kingdom's approximately 500 million
tons of annual waste, is landfill burial."8 About eighty-five percent of
hazardous waste, not specifically defined other than that "creat[ing] par-
ticular disposal difficulties, possible environmental harm and public
hazards," also makes its way into landfills.5 9
Liability for hazardous waste pollution in Britain is regulated by
several statutes:' the Public Health Act of 1936;6 the Deposits of Poi-
sonous Waste Act of 1972,62 replaced by the Control of Pollution Act of
1974;63 and the Control of Pollution (Special Wastes) Regulations of
19804 (designed to comply with the European Community Directive on
Dangerous and Toxic Wastes).
1. Statutory Liability
The Control of Pollution Act 1974, § 31, assesses criminal liability
for pollution of rivers and coastal waters:
... a person shall be guilty of an offense if he causes or knowingly
permits -
(a) any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter to enter any
stream or controlled waters or any specified underground water: ..; or
(b) any matter to enter a stream so as to tend (either directly or in
combination with other matter which he or another person causes or
permits to enter the stream) to impede the proper flow of the water of
the stream ... in a manner leading or likely to lead to a substantial
aggravation of pollution due to other causes or of the consequences of
such pollution; or
(c) any solid waste matter to enter a stream or restricted waters. 6 6
This provision of the Act was held, in Southern Water Authority v.
Pegrum,67 to impose strict criminal liability upon a farmer whose effluent
drainage system failed and overflowed into a nearby stream during a
rainstorm.6 8 Liability was imposed, despite lack of intent or negligence,
because the pig farmer's operation "caused" the pollution. The Queen's
Bench analogized "to the strict civil liability concerning the escape from
58 Macrory, supra note 34, at 335.
59 Id.
60 Id at 335-339.
61 See id. at 335 n. 8 (citing Public Health Act, 1936, 26 Geo. 5 & I Edw. 8, ch. 49, §§ 48, 72-
74).
62 See id. at 336 n. 9 (citing Deposit of Poisonous Waste Act, 1972, ch. 21).
63 See id. at 336 n. 10 (citing Control of Pollution Act, 1974, ch. 40).
64 See id. at 338 n. 16 (citing The Control of Pollution, S.I. 1980, No. 1709).
65 See id. at 338 n. 17 (citing 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 84) 43 (1978).
66 Control of Pollution Act, 1974, ch. 40, § 31 1)(a)-(c).
67 153 J.P.581, 1989 Crim L.R. 442.
68 The effluent, about five times greater concentration than "average domestic sewage," was
toxic to aquatic life in the stream. Id. at - [LEXIS p.6].
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land of harmful material recognized by the courts in Rylands v. Fletcher
[citations omitted]."69
The Control of Pollution Act, § 88, also provides for civil liability:
88. - (1) Where any damage is caused by poisonous, noxious or
polluting waste which has been deposited on land, any person who
deposited it or caused or knowingly permitted it to be deposited, in
either case so as to commit an offense under section 3(3) [unlicensed
disposal of waste] or by virtue of section 18(2) [disposal of uncon-
trolled waste] of this Act, is liable for the damage except where the
damage -
(a) was due wholly to the fault of the person who suffered it; or
(b) was suffered by a person who voluntarily accepted the risk
thereof.
(3) In this section -
"damage" includes the death of, or injury to, any person (in-
cluding any disease and any impairment of physical or mental
condition);70
2. Liability in Tort
British courts are likely to require a showing of negligence before
liability will attach for contamination-producing waste disposal, a diffi-
cult showing when the original polluter is no longer identifiable, and
"British courts... would resist holding original waste producers strictly
liable."' 71 The possibility of holding developers who fail to investigate
sites, subsequent owners, or possibly permit-granting local authorities li-
able for cleanup expenses has not been tested in Britain.72
Liability might also be founded in nuisance, which requires either
interference with the use of or physical damage to the property of the
[p]laintiff73 and, per Rylands v. Fletcher,74 strict liability attaches for
damages to neighboring land resulting from "unduly dangerous" 75 activi-
ties. In Maberley v. Peabody & Co.76 the plaintiff brought an action for
damages and an injunction against a neighbor who had piled up debris
against the wall separating their properties. The debris contained chemi-
69 Id. at - [LEXIS p.3].
70 Control of Pollution Act, 1974, ch. 40, § 88 (1)(a)-(6), (3).
71 Macrory, supra note 34, at 341.
72 Id
73 Munden, Liability Insurance Litigation for Product and Pollution Liabilities - London Per-
spective, Seminar Course Manual, Hawksmere Ltd. (London) Seminar: Product and Pollution Lia-
bility (May 24-25, 1989) at 3.
74 3 L.R.-E. & 1. App. 330 (1868).
75 W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 547 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON].
76 2 ALL E.R. 192 (1946).
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cal contaminants which percolated through the wall and was in the pro-
cess of damaging it. The court awarded injunctive relief, but not
monetary damages, to abate damage which had not yet, but threatened to
become substantial."
II. INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR POLLUTION LIABILITY
Not surprisingly, PRPs are often businesses which have, or have had
during periods of past pollution activity, comprehensive general liability
("CGL") insurance policies. Insureds' reimbursement claims for CER-
CLA cleanup costs have been met with substantial resistance by insur-
ance companies, especially when pollution has been the result of gradual
seepage or ordinary business practices over the course of many years. 78
Insurers rely upon the language of policy terms and provisions to
argue that, as a matter of contract, coverage for the vast majority of
CERCLA related claims is specifically excluded. Coverage was in-
tended, insurers argue, to be limited to accidental mishaps, occurring
suddenly, and resulting in actual injury to third-party persons or prop-
erty. However, several courts have held insurers liable for cleanup costs
resulting from gradual, cumulative occurrences, or for cleanup costs on
the insured's property.79
Insurance companies tend to deny coverage on the basis of at least
one of several interpretations of policy terms: that gradual pollution over
a long period of time does not constitute an insurable "occurrence"; that
no "occurrence" took place within the policy period; that pollution-re-
lated damages are expressly excluded; that the exception to the "pollu-
tion exclusion" does not apply because pollution resulting from gradual
or intentional discharges is not "sudden and accidental"; or that reme-
dial (cleanup) expenses do not constitute "damages" under CGL policy
terms.80
Conversely, insureds generally claim that: The manifestation of in-
jury or damages constitutes an "occurrence" because the realization of
the harm is "accidental"; coverage is triggered if the policy was in force
for any of the period between initial discharge and discovery of a delayed
manifestation; the "pollution exclusion" applies only to intentional pollu-
tion, not to intentional discharges resulting in unexpected polluting con-
sequences or to passive pollution; and the meaning of "damages"
77 Id. at 196. See also Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd., 2 ALL E.R. 145 (1961) (a nuisance
action involving noxious smell); but see Smith v. Great W. Rail Co. 42 T.L.R. 391 (1926) (a nuisance
action where damages were awarded against oil company for consigning leaky oil tank to railway
company, causing pollution to cattle farmer's water supply).
78 Cheek, supra note 27, at 75.
79 Id.




includes agency-mandated cleanup costs.8
Although the propriety of insurance coverage for environmental
pollution liability may be debatable, because of the Congressional man-
date underlying CERCLA that the polluter pay, insurance coverage nev-
ertheless constitutes a comprehensive contractual arrangement whereby
liability is covered unless specifically excluded. Insurers' and insureds'
respective arguments ultimately rely upon differing tenets of contract
interpretation.
The extent to which coverage terms under CGL policies actually
constitute bargained-for agreements is also debated. Insurers argue that
large corporations are not entitled to the same judicial treatment as are
lay people. Insurers argue that corporations tend to be more sophisti-
cated and are more likely to be represented by counsel when it comes to
the resolution of ambiguity of policy terms.82 On the other hand, even
for corporate clients, the extensive use of form policies containing virtu-
ally identical language undercuts the notion that the purchase of insur-
ance constitutes a bargained-for contractual arrangement in the first
place.83 The insurance industry is carefully regulated by state law 4 (in
some respects the insurance industry may be viewed as incorporating ele-
ments of legislation)," and by the Insurance Service Office ("ISO")
which created and promulgated standardized CGL forms to assist the
insurance industry in complying with individual state requirements.8 6
81 [occurrence] Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d
127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984); Jackson Township v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J.
Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
[trigger] New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co., 725 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1989);
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S.
1007 (1982).
[pollution exclusion] Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 89 A.D.2d 401, 456
N.Y.S.2d 504 (1982); Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 218 N.J.
Super 516, 528 A.2d 76 (App. Div. 1987); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380
S.E.2d 686 (1989).
[damages] New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del.
1987) ("New Castle I"); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1986);
Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 692 F.Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Aerojet-Gen.
Corp. v. San Mateo County Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1989).
82 Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 881-82, 887, 784 P.2d 507,
513-14, 516, (1990).
83 Id (upholding the "layman" rule that, where the meaning of an insurance policy term is
ambiguous, the plain and ordinary meaning controls, even when dealing with an insured
corporation).
84 See Abraham, supra note 23, at 985-86 (discussing possible deregulation of the insurance
industry).
85 Telephone interview with Jerold Oshinsky, Partner, Anderson, Kill, Olick & Oshinsky,
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 30, 1989).
86 J. Hendrick & J. Wiezel, The New Commercial General Liability Forms - An Introduction
and Critique, 36 FED'N INS. & CORP. CoUNs. Q. 319, 319 (1986) [hereinafter Hendrick & Wiezel].
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Insurance coverage is "triggered" by what pertinent CGL policies
define as an insurable event.87 Under policies issued prior to 1966, cover-
age is triggered by the happening of an "accident," generally defined as
"a fortuitous event that was out of the ordinary and unanticipated,"8" or
a "distinctive event that takes place at a date that can be fixed with rea-
sonable certainty."89 In 1966, the CGL policy was revised to trigger cov-
erage on a more liberal "occurrence" basis, for the purpose of including
more gradual events under CGL policy coverage.90 The change was
made partly in response to consumer demands for broader protection, as
well as in reaction to expansive judicial interpretation of the term "acci-
dent."91 "By this change, the [insurance] industry did not intend to pro-
vide pollution liability insurance to its commercial clients who
voluntarily and knowingly discharge polluting substances into the
environment."9 a
The general absence of British case law on pollution liability cover-
age may be the result of a general lack of claims for pollution liability
87 For a brief discussion of the primary "trigger-of-coverage" theories as to what constitutes an
"occurrence" in delayed-manifestation injuries, see KEETON & WIMISS, supra note 48, at 599-601.
In Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980),
reh'ggranted inpart, denied in part 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981),
the court adopted the "exposure" theory, under which injury occurs and coverage is triggered upon
initial exposure to asbestos, even though recognizable symptoms of asbestosis might not become
manifest until years later.
Under the "manifestation" theory, exemplified by the court in Eagle-Pitcher Industries v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 115 (D. Mass. 1981), aff'd, 682 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983), clearly recognizable symptoms must be manifest before coverage
is triggered.
Under the "injury-in-fact" theory, applied in American Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984), an injury, from
DES for example, must be determined to have been genuine, despite being dormant, during the
policy period.
The "multiple trigger" theory, articulated in Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034,
1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982), holds all insurers who were "on the risk"
at any time between initial exposure and delayed manifestation liable for coverage.
88 Hadzi-Antich, Coverage for Environmental Liabilities Under the Comprehensive General Lia-
bility Insurance Policy: How to Walk a Bull Through a China Shop, 17 CONN. L. REv. 769, 779
(1985).
89 M. KATZMAN, supra note 8, at 73.
90 Hadzi-Antich, supra note 88, at 780. See also KEETON & WIDIss, supra note 48, at 544-45
(stating that the 1966 form revision was probably employed to allow coverage for continuing condi-
tions ("occurrences") as opposed to sudden events ("accidents")).
91 Tyler & Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Problems in Interpretation and Application
Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 17 IDAHO L. REv. 497, 499 (1981).
92 Id. at 499-500. "The industry position with respect to the change from accident-based to
occurrence-based coverage is that 'insurers did not intend by this change to broaden liability con-




which rise to the level of litigation in Great Britain.93 British insurers
undoubtedly keep track of developments in the United States.
A. Occurrence
1. United States Approach
Whether a delayed manifestation pollution claim constitutes an "oc-
currence" under the terms of a CGL policy is the primary hurdle to in-
surance coverage. "Occurrence" based comprehensive general liability
insurance policies fashioned upon the 1973 ISO CGL form typically
provide:
[The insurer] will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the in-
sured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bod-
ily injury or property damage to which this policy applies caused by an
occurrence. ... and [the insurer] shall have the right and duty to de-
fend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such
injury or damage...
"Occurrence" is defined as:
an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured."9
Insurers contend that the "neither expected or intended by the in-
sured" language in the definition of "occurrence" prohibits coverage for
intentional releases of pollutants, especially in the course of normal busi-
ness practices over extended periods of time. Insureds contend, on the
other hand, that although the releases themselves may have been in-
tended, subsequent damaging consequences were unintended and
unexpected.96
Courts generally resolve the "expected or intended" issue in favor of
finding an "occurrence" by focusing upon the polluter's lack of intent
with respect to the harmful results of otherwise intentional acts.9 7 "[lit is
not legally impossible to find accidental results flowing from intentional
causes, i.e., that the resulting damage was unintended although the origi-
93 This general tendency was confirmed during a telephone interview with Alison Watts, Bar-
rister, Gray's Inn, London (Jan. 31, 1990).
94 Avondale Indus. v. Travelers Indem., 887 F.2d 1200, 1202 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2588 (1990).
95 Hendrick & Wiezel, supra note 86, at 328 (emphasis added).
96 Pendygraft, supra note 28, at 143-44 (contrasting court findings on the existence of "occur-
rence" on the basis of the insured's ability to foresee future consequences with the insured's present
awareness of harmful consequences).
97 Comment, Liability Insurance Coverage for Superfund Claims: A Modest Proposal, 53 Mo. L.
REv. 289, 295 (1988) (citing Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
811 F.2d 1180, 1183 n.5 (8th Cir. 1987)).
1991]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
nal act or acts leading to the damage were intentional."98
The focus is typically on the insured's expectation regarding dam-
age, as judged by a subjective standard.99 In Ray Industries v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. 1o the court noted that:
Sea Ray did not actually expect or intend that any property damage
would result from its drum disposal practices. Sea Ray did not know
its wastes were hazardous when it disposed of the barrels. In fact, Sea
Ray cannot yet be certain these wastes were hazardous. Finally, Sea
Ray believed its drums and disposal practices conformed with the laws
existing at the time.... Even if Sea Ray expected or intended the
release of its resins into the landfill, it did not expect or intend the
damage, contamination [citations omitted]. 10 1
Some courts have interpreted "expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured" to require an element of foreseeability, so that
a "substantial probability" of resulting harm may preclude a finding of
an "occurrence.""1 2 The court in New Castle III concluded that,
although the insured landfill operator had some notice of developing
leachate problems at another nearby landfill,
[t]here was neither a "substantial probability" nor an "expectation"
that off-site pollution would occur .... The County could reasonably
rely on the expectations of the professionals who designed the site and
the reports confirming the landfill was behaving in a manner consistent
with its design. The Court holds there was an occurrence, within the
meaning of the policy .... 1 0 3
It may well be appropriate for courts to consider foreseeability from
an objective (reasonable person) standard, as a subjective standard may
motivate insureds to take calculated risks. For example, in a business,
98 McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.2d 358, 364, 329 N.E.2d 172, 175 (1975) (apply-
ing "transaction as a whole" test as to whether insured's excavation actions in piling debris against
neighbor's building, although a calculated risk in the face of plaintiff's warnings, led to accidental
results).
See also Waste Management v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 695, 340 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1986)
(stating "[e]ven intentional acts, the consequences of which are unexpected, have been held to qual-
ify as 'occurrences' "); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d
127, 132, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (1984).
99 Ray Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (E.D. Mich. 1989). (citing
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc. 856 F.2d 31, 33 (6th Cir. 1988).
100 Id. (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freemand, 432 Mich. 656, 443 N.W.2d 734 (1989)).
101 Id. at 315. The court went on to hold, however, that the policy's pollution exclusion re-
leased the insurer from the duty to indemnify.
102 New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1321, 1330-31 (D.
Del. 1988) ("New Castle IP'), aff'd, New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co., 725 F. Supp.
800 (D. Del. 1989) ("New Castle lIP').
103 New Castle III, at 816. See also City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d
1052, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that results are "substantially probable" if indications are
sufficient to forewarn of high likelihood of occurrence).
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the continued use of deteriorating equipment might be tolerated because
of the presence of insurance coverage. Under an objective standard of
foreseeability, a resultant loss would not be an "occurrence."' 4 Deter-
mination of reasonable intent is generally a factual issue and, because the
"expected or intended" language is a limitation of occurrence-based pol-
icy coverage, the burden of proof lies with the insurer. 05 The necessity
for such determinations may contribute to the litigiousness surrounding
the "occurrence" issue, 106 but the interests of fairness require that occur-
rence-based coverage be broadly construed. 07 Such an inquiry as to the
fortuity of an insured's actions would be similar to a determination of
intent in tort law, which "focus[es] on the consequences, not the acts."'' 0
Because Superfund liability is strict, liability is assessed with no re-
gard for the intent of hazardous waste producers or handlers whatsoever.
It is certainly arguable that courts, generally unable to manipulate the
statutory imposition of CERCLA liability, have engaged in manipulation
of insurance policy provisions in an effort to ameliorate the draconian
104 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 48, at 521-22 (citing City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 (8th Cir. 1979)).
los See Shell Oil Co. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co. of Winterthur, No. 278953, slip op. at 27
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct., Tentative Decision Concerning Phase I Issues, July 13, 1988) (citing 19
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw, Section 79:385 (2d ed. 1983) for proposition that in-
surer has burden of proving applicability of exclusion or inapplicability of exception to exclusion).
106 In a famous dissenting opinion, Justice Cardozo called a similar difficulty posed by judicial
attempts to distinguish between accidental means and accidental results a "Serbonian Bog," (refer-
ring to the "large marshy tract of land in... ancient Egypt in which entire armies are said to have
been swallowed up." RANiOM HOUSE DICnTONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1302 (1967)).
Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499 (1934).
107 The reasonable expectation of the insured is often protected by judicial interpretation of the
meaning of "accidental," and refusal to distinguish between means and results can be an avenue of
achieving broader coverage. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 48, at 503-06.
[I]f the construction of the insurance policy language urged by insurers [that coverage
applied narrowly to only accidental means] were enforced, in many circumstances the ac-
tual scope of the protection afforded would be so limited that the acquisition of such insur-
ance would not even be contemplated by a rational individual who understood the risks the
insurer proposed to cover.
Id. at 505.
108 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 48, at 475 (emphasis in original). See also PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 75, § 8 at 35 n.15 (noting the difficulty which sometimes arises in designating
"precisely ... what consequences must be intended," as in Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279
P.2d 1091 (1955), where a boy's intention in pulling a chair out from under a woman may or may
not have been to cause harm).
"[A]n actor is [not] presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of the actor's
conduct ... [but a jury] may infer that the actor's state of mind was the same as a reasonable
person's state of mind would have been." Id § 8 at 36.
Intent is equated with "substantial certainty," whereas consciousness of acting in the face of
"appreciable risk of harm" constitutes negligence or recklessness, depending upon the degree of risk
involved. Id "The line has been drawn by the courts at the point where the known danger ceases to
be only a foreseeable risk which a reasonable person would avoid, and becomes in the mind of the
actor a substantial certainty. Id (citations omitted).
1991]
CASE W. RES. J. INTL Lo
effects of the statute when faced with a desire to provide insurance cover-
age for "appealing defendants" or to compensate "sympathetic
plaintiffs."1"9
Judicial decisions... generally hold that liability insurance does
not provide coverage when an insured intentionally causes a loss. It is
considerably less clear, however, as to whether coverage is provided by
contemporary liability insurance policies when the insured urges that
even though its action was intended, the specific consequence was not
intended."1 o
There are several possible approaches to a resolution of the question
of liability insurance coverage for intentional torts:
One approach . . . precludes coverage for a tortfeasor who in-
tended any type of harm to any person....
Another approach . . . adopts the view that innocent victims
should be entitled to indemnification from a tortfeasor's liability in-
surer so long as the insured did not intend the specific harms that re-
sulted to the specific persons harmed....
A third approach ... focuses on what a reasonable person would
view as the probable consequences of an act, rather than on the
tortfeasor's subjective state of mind.... This type of approach is ar-
guably compatible with the coverage terms now used in many types of
liability insurance which exclude coverage unless an injury "is neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." '111
An objective standard, from the viewpoint of a reasonable insured
person, is similarly appropriate for the determination of whether the
delayed manifestation of pollution constitutes an accidental "occur-
rence" within the meaning of CGL insurance policies. It strikes a bal-
ance between requiring actual subjective intent to cause polluting
consequences (which is often difficult to discern, and may lead to exces-
sive incidence of indemnification) and requiring little more than intent to
make the discharge for the preclusion of coverage (which, once estab-
lished as a factual matter, may effectively preclude coverage in the vast
majority of cases)." 2 Assessing intent from a reasonable, objective stan-
dard would allow indemnification for insureds' good faith efforts to dis-
pose of industrial waste by the employment of state of the art
methodology or compliance with existing regulations, while preventing
insureds from claiming blind ignorance of the consequences of repeated,
calculated risks.
109 Abraham, supra note 23, at 977 n. 117.
110 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 48, at 519-20.
111 Id. at 520-22 (citations omitted).




British insurance companies underwrite CGL coverage for indus-
trial clients in the United States, typically as reinsurers or excess insur-
ers. They also provide "occurrence" based liability coverage in Great
Britain for a host of situations where interpretation of the meaning of
"occurrence" is required. Such analogous situations provide a basis for
comparative analysis of the meanings of the terms and tenets of insur-
ance policy construction between the two legal regimes.
A typical British liability insurance policy provides:
The Company . .. will pay on behalf of the insured, all sums
which the insured shall be obligated to pay by reason of liability im-
posed upon the insured by law or assumed under contract or agree-




caused by and/or arising out of each occurrence happening anywhere
in the world.
The term occurrence wherever used herein shall mean an acci-
dent, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which
results in personal injury, property damage, or advertising injury,
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured, dur-
ing the policy period.' 13
British insurance law has been more restrictive than the recent line
of cases in the United States on the issue of "trigger of coverage", or
"time of loss" as it is called in England. In Cartledge v. E. Jopling &
Sons," 4 the House of Lords held that a worker's claim against his em-
ployer for contracting pneumoconiosis as a result of improper factory
ventilation was barred because of his failure to bring the claim within the
statutorily prescribed limitations period. The occurrence of the disease
was held to accrue upon the plaintiff's suffering of material damage, de-
spite his lack of symptoms until after the tolling of the statutory limita-
tions period. The court expressed lament in reaching such an onerous
result:
It appears to me to be unreasonable and unjustifiable in principle that a
cause of action should be held to accrue before it is possible to discover
any injury and therefore before it is possible to raise any action. If this
were a matter governed by the common law I would hold that a cause
of action ought not to be held to accrue until either the injured person
has discovered the injury or it would be possible for him to discover it
if he took such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances....
113 Munden, supra note 73, at 11-12.
114 1 All E.R. 341 (1963).
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But the present question depends on statute, the Limitation Act,
1939, and s. 26 of that Act appears to me to make it impossible to
reach the result which I have indicated. 115
A similar approach to the meaning of "occurrence" was recently
upheld by the Court of Appeal, Queen's Bench, in Kelly v. Norwich
Union Fire Ins. LTS. 116 The court held that, where burst water pipes
had caused heaving of desiccated clay under the foundation of the in-
sured's house, the occurrence for insurance coverage purposes was the
incursion of water into the clay (before coverage was obtained), not the
relatively sudden cracking of the foundation years later during the policy
period.
B. Pollution Exclusion
Once the existence of an "occurrence" is established under the typi-
cally broad terms of occurrence-based liability insurance policies, cover-
age may be limited by at least one of several "exclusions" contained in
CGL policies, such as the "pollution exclusion" or "damages" clauses. 17
Exclusions generally serve to limit coverage for certain types of occur-
rences which would otherwise create potential for adverse selection and
moral hazard (where the insured may be afforded an advantage because
of its superior ability to assess certain types of risk)." 8 Such limitation
serves to give the insured a "stake" in taking measures to avoid harms, as
does the presence of a deductible.
The "pollution exclusion" (added to the CGL form policy in 1973,
probably in response to recent Torrey Canyon and Santa Barbara off-
shore drilling disasters of 1969)119 typically provides:
This insurance does not apply:
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the dis-
charge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes,
acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or
other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the at-
mosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclusion does
not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release, or escape is sudden and
accidental. 120
115 Id. at 343.
116 1 W.L.R. 139 (1990).
117 Ray Indus. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (E.D. Mich. 1989);
Hadzi-Antich, supra note 88, at 780 n. 82.
118 Abraham, supra note 23, at 962.
119 Fields, Superfund: The Court Search for Insurance Money, THE BRIEF, Fall, 1984, at 7. See
also, M. KATZMAN, supra note 8, at 76.
120 Pendygraft, supra note 28, at 141 (emphasis added). See also Tyler & Wilcox, supra note
91, at 500; M. KATZMAN, supra note 8, at 76.
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As evidenced by the magnitude of litigation over the meaning and
scope of the pollution exclusion, especially since the advent of CERCLA
liability in 1980, it is doubtful that the insurance industry's initial expec-
tations have been afforded their full import by judicial decisions.
Through the development of the pollution liability exclusion, the
insurance industry has attempted to create a distinction between sud-
den/accidental and gradual/nonsudden occurrences. Sudden occur-
rences would remain covered under comprehensive general liability
policies, while nonsudden and gradual occurrences would not.
This exclusion created a gap in liability coverage for nonsudden or
gradual environmental impairment.121
Interpretation of the "pollution exclusion" generally focuses on its
exception, which rescinds application of the pollution exclusion and re-
stores coverage if the "discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden
and accidental." Although considerations of polluter intent and expecta-
tion, as advanced in Ray Industries, are generally helpful to an insured's
position with respect to the happening of an "occurrence," interpretation
of the meaning of the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution
exclusion clause has generated considerable divergence in judicial
authority. 122
1. "Accidental"
a. United States Approach
Insurers maintain that most pollution is not "accidental" because
the continual deposit or discharge of wastes over time can seldom be free
from intentional, or at least foreseeable, polluting consequences. 123 But
several courts have looked to the CGL policy definition of "occurrence"
to define "accidental" in terms of the "neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured" language contained therein, 124 de-
spite the insurance industry's attempt to limit the definition of "acciden-
tal" with the additional term "sudden."
125
Insureds point out that when the insurance industry was seeking
121 M. KATZMAN, supra note 8, at 76.
122 Technicon Electronics Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d
91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (pollution exclusion does not differentiate between intended or unintended
consequences of intentional discharge). Cf New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co., 725 F.
Supp. 800 (D. Del., 1989) (subjective intent is relevant for both "occurrence" and pollution exclu-
sion exception purposes).
123 Pendygraft, supra note 28, at 143.
124 See generally Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 91, at 507-14 (discussing Lansco, Inc. v. Dept. of
Env. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368
A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977) and Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980)).
125 Id. at 510.
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approval of its proposed introduction of the pollution exclusion in 1970,
the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau explained the reasoning behind the
exclusion as follows:
1. It is in the public interest that willful pollution of any type be
stopped in order to protect the ecological balance....
2. This endorsement is actually a clarification of the original intent,
in that the definition of occurrence excludes damages that can be said
to be expected or intended .... 1
26
Insureds maintain that the wording of the exception to the pollution
exclusion simply restates the definition of occurrence, and therefore, only
intentional pollution is excluded.127 Insurers maintain that such an in-
terpretation would make the term "sudden and accidental" devoid of
meaning.
Insureds reasonably contend that the meaning of the clause is at
least sufficiently ambiguous that standard rules of contract construction
require resolution in favor of coverage. 128  Coverage is especially appro-
priate, the argument goes, in cases where the insured is a "passive" pol-
luter: merely turning wastes over to a third party for disposal, 2 9 or
becoming the subsequent owner of a site already containing wastes dis-
126 Letter from David E. Kuizenga, Secretary, Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau, to Samuel H.
Wese, West Virginia Insurance Commissioner (Jul. 30, 1970) (expressing Bureau's position on the
pollution exclusion). See also Anderson & Sear, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Liability:
Technical and Legal Considerations, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL AND
Toxic TORT CLAIMS: INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 1989 AND BEYOND 35 (1989).
A contemporary insurance industry bulletin similarly stated:
In one important respect, the exclusion simply reinforces the definition of occurrence.
That is, the policy states that it will not cover claims where the "damage was expected or
intended" by the insured and the exclusion states, in effect, that the policy will cover inci-
dents which are sudden and accidental - unexpected and not intended.
Id. at 87 (quoting Fire, Casualty & Surety Bulletin, Property and Casualty Section, Public Liability,
Cop-l, (May 1971) at 126).
See also U.S.F.&G. v. Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 387-88, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1077-
78, (1989).
127 See Pendygraft, supra note 28, at 143; Anderson & Sear, supra note 126, at 87.
128 Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d at 384-85, 535 N.E.2d at 1075-76.
129 See Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div.
1981); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, 34 Wash. App. 708, 664 P.2d 1262 (1983);
City of Northglenn v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217 (D. Colo. 1986); Jackson Township
Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990
1982. These cases are relied upon by insureds is support of the proposition that the pollution exclu-
sion does not apply to "passive" polluters.
This position has been rejected by some courts, however, on the theory that a plain reading of
the exclusion provides no basis for such a distinction. See Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Ex-Cell-
0 Corp. 702 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co.,
727 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 910, 548
N.E.2d 1301, 549 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1989).
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charged by someone else.13
The consequences of pollution related liability have been particu-
larly unforeseen by "passive" polluters, as well as by "innocent landown-
ers,"'131 making the alleviation of polluter liability for CGL policyholders
a sensible solution. The definition of "occurrence" incorporates policy-
holder expectations, which should properly encompass some notion of
foreseeable consequences. For passive polluters, the imposition of CER-
CLA liability is particularly onerous and in a sense the liability itself
arose "suddenly and accidentally" from the standpoint of the insured.
In Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 132 the New York Court
of Appeals held that waste discharge resulting from the dumping of
drums by a prior landowner, although an "occurrence," was not "acci-
dental" for purposes of the pollution exclusion exception:
We also reject plaintiff's contention that since it was not the ac-
tual polluter, but merely inherited the problem from the prior land-
owner, the pollution exclusion clause cannot bar its present insurance
claim. Simply put, there is nothing in the language of the pollution
exclusion clause to suggest that it is not applicable when liability is
premised on the conduct of someone other than the insured.' 33
The New York Supreme Court in Powers Chemco had relied, in part,
upon Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co. 134 in
focusing upon the insured's intent with respect to the actual discharging
activity, as opposed to the resultant consequences. 135 The court rejected
the insured's argument' 36 that application of the pollution exclusion to
"passive" polluters serves no deterrence function, thereby constituting a
misapplication of the exclusion, 37 and refused to "vary the contract of
insurance to accomplish [this court's] notions of abstract justice or moral
130 See Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App.3d at 384-85, 535 N.E.2d at 1075-76.
131 See generally Hitt, Desperately Seeking SARA: Preserving the Innocent Landowner Defense
to Superfund Liability, 18 REAL Esr. L. J. 3, 7 n. 22 (1989) (stating that SARA has somewhat
ameliorated liability for subsequent owners of property who had "no reason to know that hazardous
materials had ever been disposed on the land." CERCLA § 101(35), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35) (West
Supp. 1987))".
132 74 N.Y.2d 910, 548 N.E.2d 1301, 549 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1989).
133 Id. at 911, 548 N.E.2d at 1302, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
134 Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d
91(1988).
135 Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 144 A.D.2d 445, 447, 533 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1011
(1988).
136 The insured's argument relied upon the holdings of Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co.,
80 A.D.2d 415,439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1981) and Autotronic Sys. Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casu-
alty Co., 89 A.D.2d 401, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div. 1982) (holding that the pollution exclusion
should apply to "active" polluters, enterprises actually "doing the polluting"). Such a distinction
between "active" and "passive" polluters was criticized in Note, supra note 1, at 1270.
137 Powers Chemco, 144 A.D.2d at 447-48, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 1011-12 (1988).
1991]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
obligation."13 The court's refusal to depart from strict adherence to pol-
icy language, however, seems as much an exercise of "abstract justice" as
does basing the meaning of "accidental" upon a notion of foreseeability
from the standpoint of the insured. Cannot courts also advance notions
of abstract justice by strictly construing contract terms "on their face?"
Either type of judicial decision making in this area can have far-reaching
societal consequences. 139 The appropriateness of judicial decision mak-
ing to reflect social consciousness can, however, serve the important so-
cial function of prompting legislative response.
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, in Fed-
eral Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co. " recently praised the
Powers Chemco approach in denying CGL coverage to the insured for
turning its wastes over to a local waste hauling and disposal business.
The court found that liability for response cost "damages" '' itself con-
stituted an "occurrence," and because coverage was triggered before pol-
lution exclusion policies came into effect in 1973, the court held in favor
of coverage. But the court went on, in dicta, to address the pollution
exclusion issue, and concluded that the Powers Chemco approach, favor-
ing application of the exclusion despite the insured's lack of intent (as a
138 Id. at 448, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 1012 (quoting Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 46 N.Y. 2d 351, 355
413 N.Y.S.2d 352, 355, 385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (1978)). The Supreme Court of New York, Appel-
late Division, also relied upon the same quote in justifying its temporal interpretation of "sudden and
accidental" based upon the "plain and clear language in the policy":
"Mhis court may not make or vary the contract of insurance to accomplish its notions of
abstract justice or moral obligation, since '[e]quitable considerations will not allow an ex-
tension of the coverage beyond its fair intent and meaning'" (Breed v. Insurance Co.,
quoting from Weinberg & Holman v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., see also, 1 Couch, Insur-
ance § 184, at 376) [citations omitted].
Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d at 140, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 101
(1988).
139 See Abraham, supra note 23, at 976-77. "[Judge-made insurance [can result] from disre-
garding the terms and purposes of environmental liability insurance policies." Id (stating that legis-
latures can do little to curb judicial intervention, although insurance commissioners might possibly
reshape policy provisions to increase judicial deference).
140 727 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
141 In a nutshell, the "damages" issue boils down to whether CERCLA mandated response
costs need constitute "damages" in the technical sense of the term (insurer argument) or whether the
lay person's reasonable expectations as to whether the costs of complying with equitable actions are
"damages" (insured argument) should control application of the term as used in the CGL policy
context.
See generally Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977
(8th Cir. 1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); AIU Ins. Co. v. The Superior Court of Santa Clara County (FMC Corpora-
tion), 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219, 262 Cal. Rptr. 182 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) as examples of the
insurer view; and Aerojet-General Corp. v. San Mateo County Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d
216, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1989); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F.
Supp. 1359 (D.Del. 1987) ("New Castle I"); Avondale Industries v. Travelers Indem., 697 F. Supp.
1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989) as examples of the insured view.
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"passive" polluter), was superior. The court criticized the approach
taken in Jackson Township,' 42 which distinguished between "active" and
"passive" polluters in not applying the pollution exclusion to deny cover-
age for mere ownership of polluted land. 43
The Susquehanna court refused to distinguish between active and
passive polluters because "the intent of the parties is ascertained first
from the language of the policy if possible. The pollution exclusion
makes no reference at all to active or passive polluters."'" The court
relied upon an argument from Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O
Corp., a5 i.e., that the policy terms control the scope of coverage.' 46
Since the Susquehanna court refused to engage in notions of "ab-
stract justice or moral obligation,"' 47 however, it is interesting to note
that the court implemented a unique approach to the calculation of dam-
ages for CGL coverage purposes under Pennsylvania law.'4 ' The court
stated that the proper measure of damages for injury to property is the
cost of repairing the damage, consistent with CERCLA, but proceeded
to apply a limitation on damages, inconsistent with CERCLA, based
upon either the value of the property (if remedial efforts are undertaken),
or its decrease in economic value (if the damage is permanent). The ob-
vious problem with such an approach is that CERCLA mandates reme-
dial response, the cost of which, especially in light of associated
negotiation and litigation expenses, often significantly exceeds the value
of the damaged property.'4 9
The Jackson Township attempt to ameliorate liability for "passive"
polluters was a sensible approach, but the decision went too far in afford-
142 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
143 727 F. Supp. 169, 177 (M.D. Pa. 1989). See also, Note, supra note 1, at 1271-73.
However, the "active"/"passive" polluter distinction has been upheld in some jurisdictions, on
the basis of ambiguity in insurer intent as to applicability of the pollution exclusion:
It is not clear from the circumstances of this case... that the parties intended the
exclusionary clause to apply whether the insured was an active polluter or not. Certainly,
those engaged in manufacturing processes would be expected to have sought other or addi-
tional insurance had they known that the mere act of engaging an independent agency such
as a waste disposer in the ordinary course of having industrial wastes removed from their
property would result in the denial of insurance coverage.... This ambiguity must be
resolved against [the insurer].
U.S.F.&G. v. Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App.3d 378, 385, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (1989).
144 Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. at 176-77 (citation omitted).
145 702 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
146 "Insofar as the term 'active polluter' is a rubric for analyzing whether coverage exists under
the terms of the policy, it is at best unnecessary. If, however, the term imports some additional
criteria not found in the policy, it is not part of the parties' contract." Id. at 1325.
147 Powers Chemco, 144 A.D.2d at 448, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 1012. (quoting Breed v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 46 N.Y.2d 351, 355, 413 N.Y.S.2d 352, 355, 385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (1978)).
148 Susquehanna Broadcasting Co. 727 F. Supp. at 174.
149 See Abraham, supra note 23, at 969-70 (calling insurance coverage for Superfund cleanup
liability far in excess of the value of the property a "windfall for insureds").
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ing coverage for all but the most egregious acts of intentional pollution.
The court equated the term "sudden and accidental" (in the exception to
the pollution exclusion) with the "unexpected or unintended" nature of
the result, iLe., as a restatement of the definition of occurrence. This in-
terpretation in effect emasculates the pollution exclusion to a bare exclu-
sion for willful pollution. 150 A more sensible approach would focus on
the reasonableness of the insured's lack of expectation or intention to
pollute.
Coverage has not been precluded in other areas of insurance law
where risk, which a reasonable person might easily classify as reckless,
was foreseeable and yet was subjectively perceived as manageable. In
Knight v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 151 an experienced diver, to impress
his friends, dove off the Coolidge Dam in what was "a real nice swan
dive" 152 until, unfortunately, the last instant. The court refused to deny
coverage, under an "accidental means" life insurance policy contrary to
the insurer's theory that natural and probable consequences of inten-
tional actions are not accidental. "The test is, what effect should the
insured, as a reasonable man, expect from his own actions under the cir-
cumstances." '153 The court continued:
When he pays that premium month after month he does not intend
that any act committed by him, no matter how daring, reckless or fool-
hardy, be adjudicated by a court under "reasonable man tests" or "nat-
ural and probable consequence" standards to deprive his beneficiary of
contractual rights arising out of his unintended and unexpected and,
therefore, accidental death.1 54
In the 1970s insurers never anticipated the imposition of CERCLA
liability upon insureds, and therefore never engaged in calculations to
account for it in the pricing of CGL coverage.155 But neither did in-
sureds anticipate such liability. In extreme cases, but for CERCLA's lia-
bility scheme, many insureds might simply have elected to walk away
from hazardous waste sites. The prospect of limiting coverage to the
original value of the property, regardless of the policy limit, seems as
absurd as a notion of limiting automobile liability coverage for injury to
third parties to the value of the insured's car.
150 Ballard & Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General Liabil-
ity Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 610 (1990); Abraham, supra note 23, at 962.
151 103 Ariz. 100, 437 P.2d 416 (1968).
152 Id. at 102 n.1, 437 P.2d at 418 n. 1. A witness testified that his friend "just misjudged his
distance" to the water, and "[b]ut what for he hit on his back you couldn't beat it for a swan dive."
Id.
153 Id. at 103, 437 P.2d at 419.
154 Id. at 104, 437 P.2d at 420.




A number of British cases have ruled on the meaning of the term
"accident." In Fenton v. Thorley,1" 6 an action brought by a factory
worker for an on-the-job hernia caused by overexertion at a machinery
wheel, the House of Lords stated: "The word accident is not a technical
legal term with a clearly defined meaning. Speaking generally, but with
reference to legal liabilities, an accident means any unintended and unex-
pected occurrence which produces hurt or loss." '157 The lower court had
upheld the insurer's contention that a workman's deliberate straining at
the wheel (which would not budge) could not result in an "injury by
accident,"15 because "an entire lack of the fortuitous element."15 9 The
House of Lords, however, refused to distinguish between the "acciden-
tal" nature of cause and effect, or to distinguish carelessness from
fortuity. 16
The foregoing interpretation of "accidental" is parallel to the hold-
ings of American cases, which generally uphold the applicability of "oc-
currence" based insurance coverage for harm resulting from an insured's
miscalculation or inadvertence. "The word 'accident' is not made inap-
propriate by the fact that the [insured] hurt himself."1 61
Subsequent British decisions have followed the Fenton articulation
of "accident" by focusing on the "unintended and unexpected" nature of
the event ("occurrence"), not the (proximate) "cause" leading to the
event.
In Mills v. Smith, 62 the court upheld coverage, under a house-
holder's policy covering:
Section 2 (e). Liability to public. All sums for which the assured
as occupier may be held legally liable in respect of claims made by any
person for damage to property caused by accident. 163
The damage at issue was caused by the roots of the insured's tree which
dried up the soil under his neighbor's foundation, causing uneven settling
and cracking of the foundation. This chain of events was obviously grad-
ual, and the court held that "an accident means any unintended and un-
156 Fenton v. Thorley, 1903 App. Cas. 443 (P.C.).
157 Id. at 453.
158 Id. at 443. "Injury by accident" was the triggering event for coverage under the Work-
men's Compensation Act, 1897. Id at 447-48.
159 Id. at 446. Counsel for the insurer had argued that the worker "must have done something
which he did not intend," Id. at 444, and that, in effect, if the deliberate act was the proximate cause
of subsequent injurious results, then no "accident" could occur. Id. at 447. E.g., if the "accident"
was not in the means which led to the result, then the result could not be "accidental."
160 Id. at 453.
161 Id. at 452.
162 Mills v. Smith 2 All E.R. 1078 (Q.B. Div. Ct. 1963).
163 Id at 1079.
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expected occurrence which produces hurt or loss.' 1 4 The court
struggled with which of these several causes constituted an "accident,"
and concluded that "[i]t is true that foundations settle... and that the
settling may be gradual .... [H]owever, there has come a point of time
when the movement has overstepped the safety limit... There is no acci-
dent until the overstepping takes place, [despite the fact that the cause of
the accident was gradual]. 1 65
Such an approach, holding that an accident occurs upon an unex-
pected consequence of what may have been a long-term progression,
seems appropriate in delayed manifestation environmental pollution
cases. Insurers often point to the intended actions associated with, for
example, dumping wastes at a landfill, in concluding that such actions
are not accidental. But, in the case of an underground storage tank or
water pipe which suddenly bursts, (even after a prolonged period of cor-
rosion), it seems more appropriate to view the accident as occurring upon
the happening of the unintended consequence, the accidental "event."
2. "Sudden"
A vigorously contested question remains, however, as to the mean-
ing of "sudden" as used in conjunction with "accidental" in the pollution
exclusion. On certification from the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme
Court of Georgia's recent decision in Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co. 166 dealt squarely with the issue of the temporal meaning of the word
"sudden" in the pollution exclusion context. Claussen's CGL coverage
claim, for local groundwater contamination resulting from hazardous
leachate from land which he had leased to a nearby city for use as a
landfill over a six-year period in the early 1970s, was denied by Aetna
when the EPA claim 167 arose eight years later, on the basis of the pollu-
tion exclusion. The federal district court had agreed with Aetna, con-
cluding that prolonged dumping of hazardous substances over a six year
period cannot, in any sense of the word, be considered "sudden."' 161 But
on Claussen's appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the following ques-
tion to the Georgia Supreme Court:
Whether, as a matter of law, the pollution exclusion clause con-
tained in the comprehensive general liability insurance policy pre-
cludes coverage to its insured for liability costs for liability for the
environmental contamination caused by the discharge of pollutants at
164 Id. at 1080 (quoting Fenton v. Thorley 7 Co., Ltd., [1903] App. Cas. 443, 453).
165 Id. at 1081-82.
166 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (1989).
167 The site, known as Picketville, ranked 26th on the EPA's 1985 list ranking of the 115 worst
hazardous waste sites in the nation. Love Canal ranked 24th. Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.




the site over an extended period of time?169
As to the meaning of the word "sudden," Claussen argued that it
means "unexpected" and Aetna argued that it means "abrupt."17 This
issue has spawned a great deal of litigation recently. It goes to the heart
of contract construction issues, with a host of conflicting interpretations.
Courts often begin with a consideration of a dictionary definition of
"sudden," and to the average person "sudden" at least includes a tempo-
ral element, as in "2: marked by or manifesting abruptness or haste 3:
made or brought about in a short time."' 11 However, "sudden" has
meaning apart from a temporal one, as in "1: happening or coming unex-
pectedly <a - shower>," '17 2 and the court in Claussen examined such
alternative dictionary definitions of "sudden":
Perhaps, the [abrupt] meaning is so common in the vernacular that it
is, indeed, difficult to think of "sudden" without a temporal connota-
tion: a sudden flash, a sudden burst of speed, a sudden bang. But, on
reflection one realizes that, even in its popular usage, "sudden" does
not usually describe the duration of an event, but rather its unexpect-
edness: a sudden storm, a sudden turn in the road, sudden death. Even
when used to describe the onset of an event, the word has an elastic
temporal connotation that varies with expectations: Suddenly, it's
spring. ... Thus, it appears that "sudden" has more than one reason-
able meaning. 1
73
In Claussen, Aetna also argued that interpretation of the word "sud-
den" as "unexpected," apart from its temporal "abrupt" connotation, is
at odds with the rule of construction that all parts of a contract are to be
afforded meaning." Aetna argued that, since an "unexpected" interpre-
tation of the word "sudden" in the pollution exclusion clause would be
redundant with the term "unexpected" in the definition of "occurrence,"
the term "sudden" must be afforded its temporal meaning to make sense
of its inclusion in the exclusion. The court disagreed:
The pollution exclusion clause focuses on whether the 'discharge, dis-
persal or release' of the pollutants is unexpected and unintended; the
definition of occurrence focuses on whether the property damage is un-
expected and unintended. The pollution exclusion clause therefore has
the effect of eliminating coverage for damage resulting from the inten-
tional discharge of pollutants.' 75
169 Id.
170 259 Ga. at 335, 380 S.E.2d at 688.
171 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIcIoNARY 1164 (3d ed. 1975).
172 Id. For a more involved discussion and survey of dictionary definitions of the word "sud-
den," see Ballard & Manus, supra note 150, at 613-16.
173 259 Ga. at-, 380 S.E.2d at 688.
174 Id.
175 259 Ga. at-, 380 S.E.2d at 688-89 (emphasis in original).
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Aetna's position, that each clause of the policy was intended to con-
vey a unique meaning, is also undercut by indications that at the time the
pollution exclusion was under consideration for addition to the general
policy form, the insurance companies themselves indicated that the pur-
pose of the "sudden and accidental" clause was to clarify the meaning of
the definition of "occurrence." 176
The British approach to the meaning of "sudden" will be discussed
in conjunction with that of "sudden and accidental" in the following
section.
3. "Sudden and Accidental"
a. United States Approach
The Claussen court's approach to the meaning of "sudden" seems
reasonable. Not all courts agree, however, that in combination, the
terms "sudden and accidental" should be construed solely in terms of the
insured's expectation.
In Technicon Elecs v. American Home Assurance Co.,177 the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the terms "sudden
and accidental" in the exception to the pollution exclusion clause repre-
sent two separate conditions, both of which must be met with respect to
the discharge of hazardous materials. 178 The court afforded the term
"sudden" a temporal meaning of abruptness, occurring over a time pe-
riod of short duration and without warning.179 The court applied the
term "accidental," meaning unintended or unexpected, to the discharge
itself, without regard to the resulting consequences.
Technicon had intentionally discharged waste water, containing
mercury, into a creek at its medical equipment manufacturing plant in
Puerto Rico, causing personal injury to local residents. Technicon con-
ceded that the discharges had been made intentionally and repeatedly
over the course many years, but contended that, since such discharges
were made in compliance with local permits and without intent or expec-
tation as to harmful results, that an unexpected and unintended connota-
tion should be afforded to the term "sudden and accidental", thereby
effectuating coverage per the pollution exclusion exception. The court's
interpretation in Technicon is consistent with a previous New York deci-
176 Insureds cite internal memorandums and letters submitted to state insurance boards during
that time period. See supra text accompanying note 126.
177 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1988), aff'd, 74 N.Y.2d 66, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 544
N.Y.S.2d 531 (N.Y. June 30, 1989).
178 Id at 133, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 97. citing Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1,
487 A.2d 820 (1985).
179 Id. at 134, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 97-98.
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sion 8 ° where the N.Y. Supreme Court held that "'sudden and acciden-
tal' should be construed in its entirety, without undue reliance upon
discrete definitions." 1 81
b. British Approach
A commentator has stated that British courts are likely to treat the
term "sudden," as used in the "sudden and accidental" exception to the
pollution exclusion, in terms of a temporal element which would exclude,
for instance, the continual leeching of pollutants from a landfill over
time. 182 However, in light of the approach taken to events resulting from
prolonged tree root growth in Mills v. Smith," 3 the focus of "sudden and
accidental" might be upon the first advent of leaching, not upon the con-
tinual dumping that ultimately led to its occurrence.
In Burts & Harvey v. Vulcan Boiler,"84 the Court for the Queen's
Bench Division held that insurance coverage for consequential loss re-
sulting from "[s]udden and accidental damage by any fortuitous cause"
applied to loss caused by an internal leak in a heat exchanger used in the
production of chemical compounds. The policy contained a specific ex-
clusion for "[w]ear and tear, deterioration or gradually developing flaws
or defects," and although the heat exchanger had been in service for
some time, the court held that the leak and resulting damage occurred
"suddenly and accidentally" within the meaning of the policy. The pos-
sibility existed that a manufacturing imperfection may have led to the
heat exchanger's eventual failure during the strain of exposure to extreme
temperature fluctuations during the course of operation, but the court
focused on the "sudden" nature of the failure as an insurable event.' 8 5
The foregoing analysis seems applicable to American cases dealing
with delayed manifestation situations, such as asbestosis symptom mani-
festation, building dry rot, underground storage tanks corrosion, and
landfill leachate. Courts should consider the ensuing "failure" or "catas-
trophe" as the "accidental" event, not the gradual deterioration which
led to the failure, for purposes of applying the "sudden and accidental"
180 Colonie Motors, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 145 A.D.2d 180, 538 N.Y.S.2d
630 (App. Div. 1989).
181 Id. at 182, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 632. See also Ballard & Manus, supra note 150, at 617.
Thus, when combined as a phrase in the "sudden and accidental" exception to the standard
form pollution exclusion, the words suggest that coverage is provided for, and limited to,
discharges, releases, dispersals or escapes of pollutants that begin abruptly, are fortuitous,
and that arise unexpectedly.
Id.
182 Munden, supra note 73, at 19-20.
183 Gills v. Smith, 2 All E.R. 1078 (Q.B. Div'1 Ct. 1963).
184 1 Lloyd's Rep. 161 (1966).
185 Id at 170.
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exception to the pollution exclusion. The focus of "sudden and acciden-
tal" should be upon the reasonable expectation of the insured.
Even if one of several causes of the ensuing loss was reasonably fore-
seeable, the exclusion might not apply if other intervening causes contrib-
uted to the loss as well. American courts have held that coverage for loss
resulting from multiple causes, only one of which is a covered risk, is
possible, despite explicit exclusion of other contributing causes. 186 In
such cases, if the insurer has the burden of proving the applicability of
the exclusion, then it also has the related burden of demonstrating that
the occurrence's proximate cause was an excluded one. 187
4. Construction
Insurance coverage disputes are resolved by "the principles of con-
struction applicable to commercial contracts,"' 18 which may be briefly
characterized as tending to honor the wording of the policy as indicative
of the parties' intent, giving terms their plain and ordinary meaning, and,
in the case of ambiguity, applying the "contra proferentum" rule.i89 In-
surance policy exceptions or exclusions are affirmative defenses for which
the insurer has the burden of proof. 9' Therefore, unless squarely oppo-
site with the terms of coverage, coverage should generally be provided
for events for which the insured reasonably expected coverage. Ambigu-
ity is resolved in favor of the insured, especially in the interpretation of
an exclusionary clause.
III. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis explores several of the pertinent issues rele-
vant to hazardous waste control policy concerns. The issue is complex
enough, and the monetary stakes are high enough, that a reasonable "all-
encompassing" solution is difficult to formulate. On one hand, the policy
reasons for imposing liability upon industries for costs of "doing busi-
ness" is consistent with the view that such costs should ultimately be
borne by the enterprise. 1 ' On the other hand, the indemnification of
186 See Dickson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 77 Wash.2d 785, 466 P.2d 515 (1970)
(en banc) (where crane accident caused by earth movement as well as defective weld, "latent defect"
clause in "all-risk" contractor's equipment floater policy excluded equipment repair expenses, but
not resulting damages); Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963)
(where house settling caused by leaking sewer as well as negligent construction atop fill dirt, cover-
age not excluded by "settling, cracking" clause in "all physical loss" building policy because sewer
break viewed as intervening external cause).
187 See generally KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 48, at 553-63.
188 Munden, supra note 73, at 13.
189 Id. at 13-15.
190 Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 554 F. Supp. 1075,
1076 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (citations omitted).
191 See Abraham, supra note 23, at 965 n.72 (referring to Justice Traynor's Concurrence in
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those industries which have, in a sense, had the foresight to purchase
liability insurance seems equitable and in line with the advantages of risk
pooling and risk spreading provided by the insurance industry.
Courts need to be aware of the ramifications to society in addressing
statutorily mandated questions as, "Who should pay for corporate pollu-
tion?" As with all statutory enforcement decisions, and particularly be-
cause of the additional policy concerns interjected by the involvement of
insurance coverage, courts must be aware of the proper judicial role.'92
But in the absence of legislative clarification, the courts are left to bal-
ance competing policy concerns.
The complexity of identifying, and then ranking, the nature of the
insured risks in pollution liability matters, as an initial matter, as well as
imposition of the ultimate burden for CERCLA's retroactive, joint and
several, strict-liability (which no one could have foreseen when pertinent
insurance contracts were formed), indicates the inherent dangers of de-
ciding as a "matter of law." It may be appropriate, then, for courts to
decide environmental liability insurance cases on an ad hoc basis. Many
of the ramifications and policy rationales are still being identified, but
assessment of polluter expectation and intent is critical to the process. A
state-of-the-art defense'93 is not currently available under CERCLA in
the United States, and retroactive strict liability is difficult for the insur-
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) for proposition that
manufacturer can distribute products liability costs to the public).
192 The effects judicial "manipulation" of insurance policy provisions upon the insurance in-
dustry are addressed in Abraham, supra note 23, at 960-72 (stating that "judge-made insurance,"
although serving as a consumer protection device, can be destabilizing enough to the insurance mar-
ket to make continued coverage impossible). "[J]udicial interpretations of policy language that in-
surers had regarded as fixed, clear, and limiting have expanded the scope of coverage against...
environmental liability." Id. at 960.
The proper roles of both judicial "activism" and "restraint" are aptly described as an antinomy
by Archibald Cox:
The great judge must manage to strike an accommodation between the needs of society in
the times in which he lives and the need of a free society at all times for a legal system that
binds the judges as well as the litigants. Without the last, judges would indeed be despots.
A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 124 (1987).
Surely, if the people could be asked whether judges should decide without restraint, a
heavy majority would reply, "No, they should follow the law." But if asked whether pre-
cedent should always be binding, surely the majority would reply, "No, precedent should
not always be binding. Sometimes past law was unjust."
Id. at 377.
193 In products liability law, the producer of a dangerous or unsafe product may be able to
assert, as an affirmative defense to charges of negligent design or marketing, that the product was
marketed with the benefit of best available design or safety technology. This state-of-the-art defense
is generally defined according to "the state of scientific and technological knowledge available...
[when] the product was placed on the market." J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL
16 (3d ed. 1988) (citing Tenn. Code Annot. § 29-28-105(b)).
With respect to polluter's reasonable conduct, use of state-of-the-art procedures would reduce
the foreseeability of damaging consequences.
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ance industry to accommodate,194 but when the possibility of CGL cov-
erage as a contractual matter is involved, a consideration of polluter
intent and expectation is critical. The state-of-the-art defense applies in
British asbestos cases, 195 and probably would in delayed manifestation
environmental pollution cases if they ever come about in Great
Britain. 196
The courts in Technicon and in New Castle County, one emphasizing
the word "sudden" and the other the word "accidental," both seem to
have grappled with the same issues of policy and fairness with respect to
CGL coverage for corporate polluters. The polluter in Technicon may be
properly regarded as having crossed the line of foreseeability of dire con-
sequences by continued daily dumping into a stream, despite compliance
with local ordinances. The landfill operator in New Castle County is
properly regarded as not having crossed the same line, because of its ef-
forts in researching and implementing state of the art landfill procedures.
A determination of what constitutes intentional disregard for the possible
effects of polluting activities is consistent with the policy reasons for the
coverage exclusion. "Occurrence" based insurance coverage should turn
on a determination of "intent" or "expectation" to pollute. The "sudden
and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion should be to effectu-
ate such an assessment by viewing the meaning of the term with refer-
ence to the insured's point of view, as judged by the reasonableness of the
expectation.
What if it turned out that dumping coffee grounds down the kitchen
sink was hazardous, and that suddenly hordes of homeowners were held
liable for damages? The continual household practice is certainly not
"sudden and accidental," but the consequences (and imposition of liabil-
ity for them) would be. Liability insurance coverage under a CGL policy
would be quite reasonable. But the same conclusion can no longer be
maintained with respect to, for example, used motor oil or automobile
antifreeze because reasonable people are increasingly aware of the toxic
effects associated with these substances.
United States courts should have a certain amount of leeway to ame-
liorate the draconian effects of CERCLA's strict, retroactive liability, but
they should do so in such a way that only "intentional" polluters pay and
194 See Abraham, supra note 23, at 957.
195 Telephone interview with Alison Watts, Barrister, Gray's Inn, London (Jan. 31, 1990).
196 A recent article in London's Sunday Observer Magazine indicates that pollution liability
litigation may be forthcoming in Britain. The article divulges the results of a governmental survey,
unpublished for 16 years, which established the location and potentially hazardous condition of
approximately 1,300 toxic dumps. The consequences could be particularly troublesome because, as a
result of ineffective enforcement of the Control of Pollution Act, little if any arrangements were ever
implemented for the separation of toxic materials from "regular" garbage at British landfills. Lean
& Ghazi, Britain's Buried Poison, OBSERVER MAG., Feb. 4, 1990, at 11, 17.
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"merely negligent or unaware" polluters can be afforded insurance cover-
age. This determination should be made with reference to an objective,
"reasonable under the circumstances," standard.
Whether pre-existing insurance coverage is the appropriate mecha-
nism for funding environmental cleanups under Superfund may not yet
be answerable. It may be left for Congress to decide how the financial
burden for the industrial by products of the past fifty years should be
distributed. In the meantime, the insurance industry's "occurrence"
based concept of "accident" will serve as a fair standard by which to
direct the burden either directly back to industry or more generally to
society as a whole through the insurance industry. The challenge is to
implement a liability regime which will create incentives for industry to
minimize polluting by products from now on.
Superfund has been criticized for imposing unreasonably strict stan-
dards upon industry, as evidenced by its general inability to enforce
them. Great Britain's system of hazardous waste controls, on the other
hand, while enjoying relatively successful enforcement of what regula-
tions exist, has been criticized for being unrealistically lax. It is as if the
United States has mandated environmental standards without concern
for the economic and societal ramifications, and Great Britain has over-
emphasized the economic effects at the expense of its citizens' health and
future well-being. Each country needs to move a little closer to the mid-
dle. In the United States, the insurance industry often serves as a mecha-
nism for ameliorating the harsh effects of frustrating environmental
legislation. In Great Britain, it exists as a mechanism through which
more effective environmental policy can be effected.
Looking East or West over 3,000 miles of ocean is not always the best
way to appreciate the finer points of what we may each be trying to do.
But ... I am sure our similarities are many. We both seek change
without which a system of law ceases to reflect the society it serves and
command its respect. Without change, old rules may impose an ab-
surd tyranny.... Only if lawyers on either side of the Atantic have
knowledge of and respect for the corresponding legal systems and
structures can we hope to continue to draw upon the respective
strengths of each other's systems. 197
IV. POSTSCRIPT
Since the completion of this note, several developments have contin-
ued to fashion judicial interpretation of the "sudden and accidental" ex-
ception to the CGL policy pollution exclusion.
197 Mackay, Remarks to Notre Dame Law School - London Law Centre, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 461, 463 (1989).
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In Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd.,1 98 the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin held that "sudden and accidental," reasonably ambiguous in the stan-
dard form CGL policy pollution exclusion, means "unexpected and
unintended" and not necessarily "prompt" or "immediate." 199 The
court's opinion gives a particularly interesting summary of the Mutual
Insurance Rating Bureau's submission to the West Virginia Commis-
sioner of Insurance, stating that the "sudden and accidental" language
was added to the pollution exclusion to clarify the definition of occur-
rence and exclude coverage for intentional polluters." ° The court relied
upon the distinction between polluting act and resultant damage, and
discounted the relevance of the frequency of ongoing dumping as long as
the resultant damage is unintended or unexpected. As the dissenting
opinion pointed out, if the standard is taken to require a subjective lack
of intention or expectation, the danger exists that "all negligently caused
damages are now covered, as long as the damages are not deliberate. '20 1
But as a general proposition, although statutory liability is strictly im-
posed under CERCLA, if insurance coverage does not cover negligently
incurred liability there is not much reason to purchase liability insurance
in the first place.
Representative of the other extreme, in Lumbermens Mut. Casualty
Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc.,22 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts focused upon the circumstances surrounding the release of pollu-
tants, requiring such release to have occurred suddenly for coverage to
apply. Such a strictly temporal approach, however, (and by the court's
own admission) leaves unanswered the "proper construction of the ex-
ception, if a release or discharge, initially both accidental and sudden,
continues for an extended period. As the discharge or release continues,
at some point, presumably, it would likely cease to be accidental or sud-
den (even in the sense of unexpected)."2 "3 Furthermore, a strictly tempo-
ral approach creates confusion regarding exactly which discharge
matters in delayed manifestation cases. In the abstract, when a polluter
places hazardous waste into a vessel which subsequently leaks and causes
seepage into the surrounding environment, which discharge must occur
suddenly: the initial (usually ongoing) discharge into the vessel, or the
subsequent (usually unexpected and unintended) discharge into the
environment?
In Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. EX-CELL-O Corp.,2°4 the District
198 155 Wis. 2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990).
199 Id. at 745, 456 N.W.2d at 573.
200 Id. at 750-51, 456 N.W.2d at 575. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
201 Id. at 761, 456 N.W.2d at 579.
202 407 Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568 (1990).
203 Id. at 681, 555 N.E.2d 572 n. 6.
204 750 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (amended memorandum opinion).
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Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the insurer met its
burden of proving the insured's subjective expectation or intent of dam-
age resulting from day-to-day manufacturing processes.2 °0 Under Michi-
gan law, "intent may be presumed under certain circumstances ....
'[T]he insured's intent may be actual or inferred from the nature of the
act and the accompanying reasonable foreseeability of harm .... 206
The insurer met its burden of proof by demonstrating evidence of the
insured's knowledge of the hazardous nature of its effluent wastes (based
upon environmental inspections and analyses) and its failure to adopt
adequate treatment methods (from among specific proposals including
capital investment and annual operational costs). 2 7 The court found
that the insured's denial of expectation or intent, in light of the chosen
disposal method (percolating lagoons), "[flew] in the face of common
sense.
20 8
In Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,209 the District Court
for the Western District of Washington recently found that Boeing ex-
pected or intended damage, for later years of coverage (after 1971), re-
sulting from ongoing disposal practices that had been taking place since
1961 at two disposal sites, and since 1957 at a third site, in King County,
Washington.21 0 The jury found that continuous polluting business prac-
tices had occurred for almost ten years before Boeing's reasonably fore-
seeable expectation rose to a sufficient level to preclude liability coverage
for environmental impairment. As Robert Sayler recently noted:
[Boeing's case was that] Boeing did not know at the time that these
sites were bad sites. Boeing was taking its stuff where it had to take it,
the only place it was legal to go. This was an awful long time ago [and]
it was not fair to judge, by 1990 lenses, what happened in 1960 and
1965....211
Boeing had investigated its waste disposal practices from the beginning
205 Id. at 1350-51.
206 Id. at 1350 (citation omitted).
207 Id. at 1351-54.
208 Id at 1354 (citation omitted).
209 No. C86-352WD (W.D. Wash. oral decision Apr. 16, 1990). The court found genuine
issues of material fact, as to whether and when Boeing expected resultant property damage, sufficient
to overcome Aetna's motion for summary judgment and ruled that at Washington law "'expected'
means that the insured knew that there was a high degree of probability or a substantial certainty
that damage would result .... I d. at 6. The insured carries the burden of proving lack of expecta-
tion or intention, and at Washington law the term "sudden" in insurance exclusions means "unfore-
seen and unexpected," not "instantaneous." Id. at 7, 9 (citing Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co.
v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 53 Wash. 2d 404, 333 P.2d 938 (1959)).
210 Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. C86-352WD (W.D. Wash. jury verdict
form Sept. 21, 1990).
211 Address by Robert N. Sayler, Partner, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. and co-
counsel for Boeing, at Association of American Law Schools, Open Program on Insurance Law (Jan.
6, 1991).
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and had generated documents showing "that they knew that there was a
risk, that nobody in 1960 was sure how to handle hazardous waste.
They're not in 1990 either, and honest companies would write the same
documents today: 'we don't know for sure, we'll do our best.'..."'
Despite this smoking gun, the jury agreed that Boeing did not expect or
intend damage until 1971, when Boeing "should have expected or in-
tended damage."213
In the effort to fashion acceptable limits of how much foreseeable
harm a polluter may cause without endangering its comprehensive gen-
eral liability coverage, courts should continue to be reluctant to impose
strict liability standards upon insurance contract interpretation matters,
particularly for environment damaging practices employed decades ago.
A foreseeability standard, requiring something greater than negligence
and in a sense analogous to the British recognition of a "state-of-the-art"
defense, seems appropriate in judging the point at which ongoing pollu-
tion causing activities should preclude insurance liability coverage.
Resolution of delayed manifestation environmental impairment lia-
bility correctly involves a factual inquiry, directed towards establishing
when a polluter knew, or reasonably should have known, that its ongoing
(business) practices were causing deleterious consequences. A "reason-
ably foreseeable" inquiry, in accordance with the information and level
of knowledge available at the time of the ongoing polluting activities,
serves to balance the competing concerns as to whether foreseeable con-
sequences of polluting activities should be judged objectively or subjec-
tively. At some point, ongoing polluter negligence becomes reckless
enough that intent or expectation should be presumed and liability cover-




* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve School of Law (1991), B.A., Bates College (1979).
Vol. 23:109
